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A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE LAW SCHOOLS
GEORGE D. HoRNSTEIN *
TN THE quest for justice, everyone concerned with legal machinery
i-must be disturbed by the frequent dichotomy between the goal and the
actual result of the administration of law. As a practicing lawyer, I
suggest that this cleavage can be narrowed by legal education. If this
assumption is valid, practices in legal education command an interest
and importance far transcending their value simply as pedagogical tech-
niques for the training of practitioners.
The concept of what makes up "the law" is necessarily broad. The
layman or the legislator thinks first of a statute duly promulgated. The
lawyer or the judge thinks first of judicial decisions (an attitude which
is itself a commentary upon the effect of legal training). The research
scholar now also ranks high lawyers' opinions 1--a circumstance which
should remind us that opinions of contemporary lawyers, before they
become history, may be effective as a source of law and sometimes more
effective than statute or reported decision.
To these sources of law must be added discussions in the law class-
room, which, I contend, are in themselves part of our system of justice.
Excusable may be past failure to recognize the effect upon law-making
of methods of legal education; but we cannot now close our eyes to the
profound influence of the law school as a formative force in the law-
making process. Not only prospective lawyers, but also future kgisla-
tors, judges, and writers who sit together side by side develop a point of
view from classroom discussion; their approach to future action and
judgment is often determined by it.' The power of student criticism in
* Member of the New York bar.
I During the eighty years following enactment of the Bubble Act In 1720, the
English corporation law guiding and regulating great enterprises was to be found
not in the statutes, nor in judicial opinions, nor even in the treatises of the time,
but in the opinions of counsel which enabled these enterprises to be conducted with
a minimum of resort to the courts. For a fully documented study of this period,
see AmmAwD BUDINGToT Du Bois, THE EXGListH Busixsss CoMPAy ArTrm Th,
BuBnBLE AcT, 1720-1800 (1938).
2 "This book could not have been written without the eager cooperation of forty
classes of students. In the discussions in the classroom one's mind is cleared more
than in a score of years of private investigation. One submits one's conclusions to
the class and the class pick out the weak points, ruthlessly out-argue an illogical
rule or one not fairly based upon ethics or the requirements of society." BVaT ,
OON IJCT OF LAws, Preface, vii (1935). To the same effect, see also Oration of
Mr. Justice Holmes at Cambridge, Nov. 5, 1886, on the 250th Anniversary of Har-
vard University, 3 L.Q.PiEv. 118, 122 (1887).
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the formulation of law is implicit in the witticism: "From the Supreme
Court of the United States there is no appeal-except to the law re-
views."
Where an explicit statement of standards of values is lacking, the
students' discussion of the principles of a particular case may appear to
be without relevance to the goal of justice-the most important aspect
of law. Yet, value judgments and other preconceptions which students
bring to the law school class (whether determined by ethical background,
philosophic acumen, social-bias, or what not) will mold the discussion
significantly. And discussions influenced by the character-social, eco-
nomic, educational, racial, religious, or sex-of the student body will
inevitably affect the future lawmakers. In consequence, the discussion
and the students who do the discussing must be recognized as a vital
part of our system of justice.
This article proposes to show by q survey of Anglo-American legal
education a decisive trend (1) from a homogeneous student body coming
from a single social class to a heterogeneous student body-men and
women-drawn from all segments of the population; (2) from a curri-
culum designed to preserve the status quo to a system of law formulated
with a view to promoting the "general welfare"; and (3) from a method
of study-memorization-appropriate to the learning of presumably im-
mutable law, to use of the scientific method in an effort to ascertain what
the law should be.
I
THE LAw STUDENTS
Prior to the American Revolution the bar had been a compact, homo-
geneous unit representing a single social stratum.' This country, espe-
cially after the Revolution, witnessed a considerable broadening of the
class studying law.4 The circumstance that a large percentage of those
registered at the Litchfield School in Connecticut during the period
1784-1833 possessed college degrees before entering upon the study of
law 5 permits the inference that their financial status made possible such
extended study, at that time not available without considerable cost.
3 Great caution seems to have been observed in admitting persons as members
of the Inns of Court, and an order bearing the signatures of both Coke and Bacon
directs that no one be admitted unless he be "a Gentleman by descent." WnLI.m
DUGDALE, OiGINES Jnn axctxiss 316 (1st ed. 1666). The tremendous cost of study
at the Inns further served to' exclude all but the very wealthy; there was an
occasional exception, so rare as to be a matter for comment. HEzmm CoH.,
A HlisTony OF T= ENGLISH BAn AND ATTOmNATus 471-472 (1929).
4 CZRLES WAupxN, HISTORY OF THE AMERIcAN B.n, passim (1911).
5 SAMUEL H. FIsHEn, LTcHEELD LAW SCHO4L, 1774-1833, Bio ApnIcAL CATA-
LOGUE OF STUDENTS 6 (1946).
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Yet more than half did not have college degrees. Moreover, it became
possible in this country to enter upon the practice of law without attend-
ance at any law school. *During the nineteenth century in the United
States enough lawyers came from the less well-to-do elements of the
community (as did Abraham Lincoln) to assure a broader base.
Today the body of law students in this country comprises a hetero-
geneous group of both sexes, of diverse social and economic classes, and
of different races and religious faiths, although the proportions of each
type are far from being completely representative." Nor is thediverse
character of the law students necessarily represented in individual law
schools. Until World War II, women, when present at all, constituted
a minute percentage of the students at the nationally famous law schools
(and are to this day still completely barred from Harvard Law School);
those in the lowest economic group in the population, who had to earn a
livelihood while attending law school, studied at unapproved part-time
law schools (schools open to late afternoon or evening students); 7
most Negro students received their training at law schools serving ex-
clusively members of their race; 8 and a relatively large proportion of
Catholic students studied at Catholic law schools?
World War II partially changed this condition in the top-ranking
schools, at least temporarily. During the war, when most able-bodied
young men were in the armed -forces, Columbia and Yale accepted in-
creasing numbers of women students, who at times constituted approxi-
mately 25 per cent of the small wartime classes; e.g., of sixty-one in a
Columbia class, seventeen were women; of fifty-two in a Yale class,
fourteen were women. With a return to "normal" conditions, with ap-
plications from prospective students four or five times as numerous as
the limited group which are accepted, the number of women students in
6 Unfortunately, accurate statistics are unavailable except for sex and color.
The 1940 census figures disclose the following allocation of "Lawyers and Judges":
Male Female Total
White 172,329 4146 176,475
Colored 1,127 41 1,168
Total 173,456 4187 177,643
SixTENTH CENsUs or Tm UNITED STATES, 1940, III UNITED STATES SumiAny, Pt.
1, Population, pp. 75, 88, 90.
7 In unapproved part-time schools many noted lawyers and public figures have re-
ceived their legal training and have amply justified the views which made It possible
for them to embark upon the study of law. See, e. g., 118 N.Y.L.J. 1751 (1947) for a
list of distinguished graduates of the New York Law School.
8 Thompson, Some 0riticaZ Aspects of the Problem of Higher and Professional
Education for Negroes. 14 J. NEGRO EDUCATION 509 (1945).
9 The administrative head of a large metropolitan Catholic college advises me
that a majority of graduates from his college who study law go to Catholic law
schools, and that this proportion is confirmed generally by the heads of other col-
leges with whom he has spoken.
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these highest-ranking schools has again progressively approached the
vanishing point.
Also, the top-ranking and sought-after schools, which can afford to be
selective in peacetime, attempt to obtain geographical distribution by
having as many states as possible represented in the make-up of their
entering classes.10 This practice is desirable in procuring for the class-
room the viewpoint of all sections of the country; but geographical limi-
tations-unduly favorable to the small states-militate against propor-
tionate diversification of racial and religious strains, since the majority
of Negro, Catholic, and Jewish applicants come from the large cities.
As a result of veterans' aid, the law school has become better repre-
sentative of all economic groups in the population. The "G.I. Bill of
Rights" has for the last two years made possible attendance at day law
schools by many for whom it would not otherwise have been possible,
the student body in these day law schools being about 90 per cent
veteran.
To make pre-legal education possible for representatives of poorer
economic groups, it may be desirable to make provision beyond the G.I.'s
governmental educational benefits and subsistence. The prerequisite of
some college education now sets up (despite the free state universities) a
severe and frequently complete barrier to many potential law students of
low family income." This prescription of a minimum of college study
may at first sight appear inconsistent with American political principles;
in fact, over thirty states do not even today require law school training,
presumably because such a restriction may keep from the law those who
are worthy but without, the resources necessary to finance formal
law school education.' Yet many of these very states do require a
minimum of two years of college work before law study begins, even
where the law study may be in an office.
1 3
The requirement of college training (or its equivalent) is amply jus-
tified. If full, profound discussion is to be had in the law classroom, the
student should come to it already imbued with the scientific method, an
understanding of logic, and a familiarity with the social sciences and
the "humanities"--training not currently secured below the college level.
10 A comparative chart by states for the most recent entering classes at Harvard
and Columbia will be found in Columbia Law School News, April 16,'1948, p. 2.
11 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMEISSION ON HIGHER EDUCATION, I HIG] R PDfU-
CATIqN ro. AERIANT DAmocn&cy 27-28 (1947).
121947 REvIEw OF LEGyAT EDUcATIoN 20-25, (Am.BAr. Ass'x 1948). Cf. England,
where candidates cannot now become solicitors unless they have pursued for at
least a year a course of legal education at a law school approved by the Law
Society. Solicitors Act, 1922, 12 & 13 GEO. V, c. 57, § 2.
13 RULES FOR AmISSION TO Tmm BA (West Publishing Company, 13th ed. 1947).
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This prior training is no mere social and cultural decoration; it is essen-
tial in determining values, expounding a design for justice, and enabling
one to express himself with vigor and precision.
The increasingly democratic character of law school classes, regardless
of whether the representation is fairly proportionate for all types, augurs
well for fuller and more inclusive consideration of all those elements
which should determine law. Fresh views as to the purpose of law
may confidently be expected-views not likely to have been formulated
in a chamber of judges personally inexperienced in the problems of nine-
tenths of the population. Sheer increase in the number of law students
and lawyers multiplies the chances that they will not all think alike. A
uniformity of view conceivable in the 350 men who constituted the
English Bar at the time of the American Revolution 14 is inconceivable
in, the American Bar, which at the last census numbered 177,643 duly
admitted lawyers."5
Although the body of law students has evolved from a homogeneous
to a heterogeneous group, one significant condition remains unchanged.
Throughout history, the law student body has included some who do
not intend to put to vocational use their knowledge of "law." In all
Renaissance universities, law studies were the center of learning for
students who had no thought of ever practicing law. In England, most
of those attending at the Inns of Court were preparing for political and
social life, not for the bar. Today the more renowned the law school,
the more students there are in it who do not contemplate becoming prac-
titioners. Can we learn something from their interest in the study of
law?
Legal study, whether at school or not, imparts a skill highly prized
in many walks of life. Edmund Burke noted that study of the law "ren-
ders men acute, inquisitive, dexterous, prompt in attack, ready in de-
fence, full of resources." 16 The qualities just described are a by-product
accompanying the acquisition of a special knowledge-familiarity with
the content of "the law" and with the techniques of handling the ma-
chinery of law. 7 This by-product skill has a recognized value independ-
ent of professional utility, and causes law-trained men to be very much
14 IacKinnon, The Law an the Lawyers, printed in 2 JoHNsox's ENGLAND 287
(A. S. Turberville ed. 1933).
15 See note 6 supra.
16 JOSEPH VILLIES DEHNEY (ED.) ED=UND BUiucu's SPEECH ON CoNCILIATioN
wmrH AmERIOA 54 (1898).
17 Lasswell and McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional
Training in the Public Interest, 52 YALE L.J. 203, 210-211 (1943); MeDougal, The
Law Scheol of the Future: From Legal lzealism, to Policy Science in the World
Commun ty. 56 YAL L.J. 1345 (1947); Leach, Property Law Taught in Tw(o Pack-
ages, 1 J. LEGAL ED. 28, 30-31 (1948).
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in demand as public leaders and business executives. The advice of the
law-trained man is sought because frequently he has better vision and
greater skill in implementing his ideas than a man without this or equiva-
lent training. The question seriously presents itself whether-as so
often in industry-the by-product is not more valuable than the ad-
mitted vocational goals.
II
THE SUBJECT OF STUDY
What modern law students learn (or, depending on the viewpoint,
what they are taught) discloses considerable change from the subject
of study centuries ago: 1 (1) Present-day students generally acquire an
"approach" or attitude to substantive law; (2) they discover and evalu-
ate present-day sources of substantive law; (3) they learn segments of
what is called well-established substantive law, and in the first-rate law
schools acquire considerable skill in analysis; (4) they learn a little, very
little, adjective law. 9
The lacunae in the present-day curriculum are clearly apparent-
Omitted from the curriculum are' large sections of fairly well estab-
lished substantive law, an "approach" to adjective law, and an acquisition
of skill in the operation of the legal machinery. Another regrettable,
but in this instance easily remediable, omission is the failure to give an
introductory course explaining to the students the law school's function
and mode of procedure, the reason for the methods employed, a state-
ment of what kinds of knowledge and what skills the student is expected
to acquire during the law school years, and, equally important, what he
is not expected to learn, so that he will not feel frustrated and inade-
quate during his law school studies.
18 In England, almost up to the American Revolution, the approach was simple.
Protection of the landed interests was then considered the essential need of society
to such an extent that Maitland has declared that ngland's "whole constitutional
law seems at times to be but an appendix to the law of real property." F. W. M.4.-
LAND, Tim CoNsTITuToIAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 538 (1908). Past decisions were
therefore the law, and to learn law all one needed to do was learn the precedents.
The foregoing summary is believed fair as a sweeping survey, although English
law in spots did show the effect of conflicting interests pressing for different re-
sults. Economic ends were considered by some old-time judges who, however, did
not appreciate the extent to which their conclusions were determined by the inter-
ests of their own social stratum. Adjective law was also studied; in fact, most
decisions were procedural and therefore really "precedents" (forms)-the tools the
student would use throughout his life.
19 For convenience in discussion, law is being arbitrarily divided into two parL,3
substantive and adjective, although in practice the two are so interrelated as to be
inseparable. No positive law operates in a vacuum, and the adjective element prob-
ably outranks the substantive contribution in importance.
1 J OUNAL OF LEGAL D.NOA.-4
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A
The substantive law is inseparable from the "approach" to law which
is acquired, often unconsciously, at law school. Lip service may be paid
to the doctrine that positive law is made primarily by the legislature
and interstitially by the courts, but the weighting of the values which
determines the final result comes from one's "approach." Whether a
statute will be adjudicated "in derogation of the common law" and there-
fore strictly construed-i.e., rejected as far as possible-or whether it is
"remedial" and therefore to be enforced, is determined by the court's
attitude on the power of a legislature to make changes, not by anything
in the statute itself. Overlapping theories of jurisprudence are inevita-
ble. The medieval mechanical follower of precedent had his sociological
approach, though it was different from that which a majority favors to-
day. His view was that the status quo must be maintained. The most
rabid sociological jurisprudent of today is at the same time an advocate
of precedent-the precedent that jurists in the future shall likewise pro-
ceed on the view that law is a means to implement a specific end: "the
general welfare." Each could, and probably would, characterize the
judgment he reaches as morally correct, thereby bringing them both into
the camp of followers of "natural" law. The weighting of each point
of view varies, however, and permits the long-range observer to classify
certain stages of legal history as more representative of one attitude than
another; e.g., the precedent or common-law approach was prevalent in
England almost up to the American Revolution; a natural-law approach
exercised some influence in the Colonies; the sociological approach has
been popular during the last two decades. The approach is affected by
the cultural milieu of the teachers and the students; and when the back-
ground of enough students prevents their accepting the doctrine laid
down by the teachers, a change may be expected to ensue in the courts
and in the next generation of teachers.
Recognition of this interrelationship makes positive law at a particular
period more understandable, but the student does not always realize that
his "approach" is determining the law he finds. To comprehend the
major significance of this subtle element in the formulation of law, the
student requires a foundation in history and the social sciences broader
than is to be found in merely the study of "law." Once one appreciates
the part played by one's approach (whether that of the student or that
of the judge who wrote a precedent opinion), the comprehension and
formulation of law becomes simpler, apparent conflict in rules becomes
understandable---and what is understood can be worked with.
1 JOUAL OF LEGAL 31.No.4
.[VoT. I
A LAWYER LOOKS AT Tm LAW SCHOOLS
Led by Columbia and Yale in the late Twenties, some twenty law
schools now make some effort to interrelate elements of economics and
sociology so that discussions in class need not be derived solely from
historical conditions and the needs of times past, but may be based on
current conditions and present needs."0 The manner in which presenta-
tion of these elements can best be accomplished has been the subject of
intensive study. The Columbia Law School almost twenty years ago
compiled a summary of the problems and proposed solutions outlined
by the faculty at that school.2 ' Just how significant the effects of this
new approach could be were disclosed by its first fruits: A. A. Berle's
Cases and Materials in the Law of Corporation Finance and a modified
textbook, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, written by
him in collaboration with Gardiner C. Means, the economist.," The first
volume, published in 1930, made available material showing how a busi-
ness corporation is really financed and operates (a sharp contrast with
obsolete practices gleaned from hoary "leading"-and misleading-
cases). This volume contained not merely cases and relevant state stat-
utes, but also the living background of "law": documents originating
corporate financing and other corporate instruments, including a thirty-
five page trust indenture, New York Stock Exchange listing require-
ments and papers filed pursuant thereto, economic data on the size of cor-
porations and the state chosen for incorporation, and views of a writer
frequently consulted by financiers.23 The supplemental volume, The
Modern Corporation and Private Property, analyzed the extent of "the
corporate revolution" through which we are passing, disclosing it to be
quite as important as the industrial revolution in its effect upon man's
life and "law."
For the purpose of ascertaining the effect of the new material in use,
I have recently compared three sets of student notes on Corporations:
(1) an almost verbatim transcript made by a Harvard student in 1892-
93 (the teacher: ex-Judge Jeremiah Smith; the casebook by Professor
20 ESTErt LUCILE BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS, AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE
(1948), is an excellent report to the Russell Sage Foundation on the "dynamic, on-
going movement within legal education as it existed at the outbreak of World War
II." Id. at 9.
21 COLUMBiA UmIVERSITY, FAOULY OF LAW, SU MMARY OF STUDIES IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 20, 75 (Oliphant ed. 1928). The Yale Law School faculty now includes
professors of economics, political science; and philosophy-all three teachers being
non-lawyers. Harvard Law School, in contrast, has relevant materials from the
social sciences taught by regular lawyer-members of the faculty.
22 The material for the two volumes, published respectively in 1930 and 1932,
was gathered as part of a research project under the direction of the Columbia
University Council for Research in the Social Sciences.
23 Of. Edward H. Warren's Cases on Corporations (1909), which in an Appendix
likewise made available to students a number of corporate documents. Berle's
Cases and Materials takes the student one step below the surface of Warren's forms.
19491
JOURNIAL OF LEGAL EDUCATION
Cumming of Columbia, 1892); (2) my own notes taken at Columbia
in 1926 (the teacher: George F. Canfield; the casebook by Professors
Canfield and Wormser, 1925); (3) the notes of a Columbia student in
1946-47 (the teachers: A. A. Berle and William C. Warren; the case-
book by Professors Dodd and Baker of Harvard, 1946). The earliest
set of notes was for the first class in Corporations ever to use a printed
casebook; " the second, for almost the last Columbia class before the
1927 implementation of sociological jurisprudence; and the third set is
representative of the current method. The three classes, all in the field
of general corporation law, were conducted on the same level, so far as
analysis goes, and almost the same traditional "legal" topics were cov-
ered; but the conception of a corporation in action as derived from the
third set of notes is so revealing as to make almost a half-truth that
derived from the preceding sets of notes-even as late as 1926. Ap-
parent now is the full extent to which the American business corporation
has changed from a private enterprise, with limited powers and definitely
fixed stockholder participation and control, to the modern colossus in
which corporate powers are boundless, managerial powers are virtually
unlimited, and correspondingly the rights of individual stockholders and
control by them have largely disappeared. The uncovering of this ac-
tual situation makes it clear that the law of corporations-at least in so
far as gigantic corporations are concerned-must likewise change from
rules aimed to cover "private" transactions to rules whereby the in-
terests of the investing public and the state are protected. The sub-
ject of corporations, perhaps better than any other, demonstrates that
only continuous awareness of actual conditions can make the "law" com-
patible with the legitimate needs of the community. The law appro-
priate to municipal corporations was scarcely serviceable to the private
corporation of a century ago; the law of the private corporation is
dangerously inadequate for the large publicly financed corporation of
today, which has made a stock certificate as common and acceptable in
civilized society as checks and paper money.
"Materials" for use together with cases have appeared in other branch-
es of law-administrative law, criminal law, and a number of the con-
ventional "private law" subjects. Very little nonlegal material has thus
far actually been integrated in the law school program, even in the field
24At Columbia, in 1891, the subject of Corporations was not taught at all, we
are told by Mr. Justice Cardozo, who was a student there at that time. OAnDozo,
LAw A LITEUATuRE 165 (1931).
25 The Columbia Law School's Announcement for 1947-1948 describes the cur.
rently offered course in general corporation law as follows: "Classical corporation
laZw with which is combined the principal rules and operations of corporation finance.
Consideration is also given to some of the changes in the property system resulting
from the extension of the corporate method of business organization."
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of corporations, but it is significant that experimentation is going on at
all.
26
Law formulated upon knowledge of actual conditions and practices,
rather than upon a rare aberration, may be longer lasting. Much will
always remain to be done in ascertaining and interpreting the data of
social science-or "social not-yet-science," as it has also been charac-
terized; but whether it is science or not, attention to the part it plays
and should play in the formulation of law is 'now a very pervasive
feature of law school discussion.
!The present paper does not advocate that any one approach should be
sponsored by all the schools or even by any one school. Uniformity is
not a desideratum in higher education; it discourages that comparison
which is vital to progress. But it is important that the student realize
that everyone-teacher and fellow-student, as well as judge-is pro-
ceeding from some preconceived standard of values and that the stand-
ard used will affect the result. Those who disapprove of the "policy"
approach of our leading law schools are not being neutral. They would
try to keep the law student ignorant of the fact-an indisputable f act-
that law is a means of social control.
Finally, we must note an additional, by no means new, explanation
of judicial decisions which has received some scholarly attention during
the last few decades. Sometimes denominated the Realistic or Neo-
Realistic or Gastronomical approach (although really a caveat rather
than an "approach"), it points out that judicial decisions are not always
the result of judicious thought and warns of the influence on decisions of
the judge's digestion, itching palm, and other non-intellectual conditions.
Such factors are, of course, of major importance to the parties involved
in an individual case, but, except in a precedent-bound society, have
comparatively little effect upon the body of our law. The judges pur-
port to be bound by rules of law-whether found by precedent, natural
law, or sociological approach.
B
The sources of substantive law are weighted by the "approach," which
can act as a catalytic agent transmuting "hard law" into justice. Readily
apparent is the extent to which the "approach" will determine the law
26 An abortive Yale Law School project proposed that the regular three-year law
school course at New Haven be interrupted to provide a year's training in Cambridge
at the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, with courses in Pro-
duction, 'Marketing, Finance, Accounting, Statistics, and Public Utility Economics.
(Dean's Reports 1932-1933 through 1938-1939.) Lack of enrollment caused the dis-
continuance of this interesting venture.
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"found." A jurist who considers adherence to precedent the prime
goal is less likely to consider or give weight to changed conditions than
one employing the sociological approach. Since a superabundance of
cases supplies adequate material for the support of any or all approaches
suggested, the choice of material by the law school teacher makes it
possible to guide the students into one or another of them. Precedent
was the earliest and still is the easiest. At Catholic law schools, whMli
are frankly unsympathetic with "modern legal philosophy," the "natural
law" approach plays a greater part in training than in the nonsectarian
schools. All law schools in this country at least call attention to the
sociological approach, and the most renowned (i.e., those with nationally
respected faculties) give some training in it. At such law schools, stu-
dents today come to view the sources of law as follows:
Legislation changing the law is an accepted means of social control in
a democracy. The statute, in theory, is the voice of the majority pre-
scribing a rule for the future on the basis of present-day vision as to
the needs of the future-it is prospective both in formulation and in
operation. A statute, however, cannot possibly provide for all situations.
Even where it appears to do so, a statute is inanimate except as applied
by the courts. For application and interpretation, we turn to the courts
and "case law."
In case law, precedent is utilized as a tool-as a means, not an end.
The practice of following judicial precedents has been and is the working
rule of our law. A decision by a court of competent jurisdiction on a
controverted question of law not only is binding on the parties before
the court, but also is generally considered an authority to be followed by
the same court or courts of lower rank in subsequent cases, where the
significant features or subsumptions are the same. Precedents help give
certainty, and (if there are no conflicting precedents) they enable the
court to render a decision speedily, much more quickly than if the court
had to consider the problem involved afresh in every case. But this does
not mean that precedent is law-conclusively.
The apparent law gleaned from prior reported judicial decisions is
generally not binding upon the courts if the result would be unjust.,2
27 A broad exception must, however, be noted: "In matters of property and
commercial law, where the economic forms of the social interest in the general
security-security of acquisitions and security of transactions--are controlling,
mechanical application of fixed, detailed rules or of rigid deductions from fixed
conceptions is a wise social engineering." IRoscon POUND, INTERPRETATIONS oF
LEGAT HIsTony 154 (1923). Real property titles and, to some extent, the field of
bills and notes require, as a matter of convenience, that conduct and terms used
therein be regarded as symbols and always given the same connotation. In these
cases "the finality of the rule is in itself a jural end." C(JDozo, TuH. PAmnxuoxns.
oF LEGAL ScmxEcz 67 (1928).
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The refusal to regard case precedents as conclusively determinative is
not a radical innovation; it was applied by Bracton, 5 was approved by
Blackstone ' and Kent,30 and more recently was referred to by Chief
Justice Stone as "the very life of the law." 31 Paradoxically, nothing
is better established by precedent than the principle that precedents are
not necessarily binding.
32
Precedent is not lightly disregarded; neither are ideals and goals.
Even well-reasoned precedents should not be binding if they do not
conform to the pragmatic standard, or if they are based on goals or on
premises now obsolete or on economic or social conditions which have
changed. Current judicial theory, perhaps sensitive to the impact of the
scientific method in education, regards law as a branch of human ex-
perience which must evolve with the complex developments of life. By
its nature, law is evolutionary, both in itself and in its adaptation to a
continuously evolving world. Static rules cannot forever be the molds
to which the body social must conform.
Few will now be found to urge seriously that there was, is, or can be
an unchanging permanence in principles of justice, or that the law can
never be improved.3 3 We would not today want to be governed by the
dead hand of the past-by the lex talionis,3 4 by the principles of justice
inherent in medieval serfdom, or even by the almost as barbarous rules
of Coke's day.3 ,5 Law, in fact, is not static, and there is hardly a rule
or doctrine of case law which has not been abolished, changed, or modi-
,28 PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE CommoN LAW 231-232 (4th ed. 1940).
29 1 BL.COMM3. *69-70 (1765).
30 IENT, CoIi=Rns 444 (1826).
31 HARLAN FISKE STONE, LAW AND ITS AD -IISTRATION 47 (1924).
32 In 1821 Professor Greenleaf of Harvard published a volume listing overruled
cases. Between 1840 and 1856, "upwards of fifteen hundred cases" made neces-
sary a fourth edition. SimoN GREENLEAF, A COICTION OF CASES OVERRULED,
DENIED, DOUBTED, or LImED IN T APPLICATION, TAKEN FROM AME IoAN AND
ENGLISH REPoRTS, Preface (4th ed. 1856). For a list of important decisions recently
overruled by the Supreme Court of the United States, see Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 665, n. 10, 64 Sup.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed. 987 (194).
33 Aristotle noted that a problem arose when a written law remains, but no.
-longer under the conditions which led to its enactment. As early as his day laws
were to be found "contradictory to another approved law." AmSTOME, "ART" OF
RHETORIc, Bk. I, xv, fol. 1375b (Freese trans. 1926).
34 Under the Code of Hammurabi if faulty construction of a house by the builder
causes the death of the owner, the builder is killed; if it causes the death of the
son of the owner, not the builder but the builder's son is killed. ROBERT F ANC is
HARPER (ED.), THE CODE OF HAnMuE3ux 81, §§ 229-230 (1904). Biblical law did
not carry the doctrine of lem talionis this far. Ex. 21:24; Lev. 24:19.
35Witchcraft, adultery, and murder were all crimes and all offenses of equal
degree-all punishable by death. On the eve of the Industrial Revolution, death
was the prescribed punishment in England for 160 offenses, 4 BL.COMM. *18 (1765),
some of which today are not considered sufficiently serious to bring an offender
into court.
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fled.36 The flux and change seen in conflicting rules both in statute&
and in judicial opinions are evidenced by the demand for Uniform State
Laws and the American Law Institute's Restatements. Further recog-
nition that specified case law is at times anachronistic and requires re-
form--changes too drastic to be applied by retroactive judicial decision-
is to be found in the annual suggestions for statutory changes recom-
mended by New York's Ministry of Justice-the Law Revision Com-
mission (for substantive law) and the Judicial Council (for procedural
law)." Future changes are inevitable as long as there is growth. "I do.
not think we are more inspired, have more wisdom, or possess more
virtue, than those who will come after us." 38
C
Familiarity with what are believed to be the substantive rules of law
is one of the major aims in law school study. Knowledge of black-letter
law is desirable both to suggest "the law" and to permit arrangement
of the material into an ordered pattern from which departures or chang-
es may be more systematically noted and evaluated. The practice of
the highest ranking law schools in continually emphasizing the possibil-
ity of change is adopted deliberately to avoid the great danger that
students will conclude that a statement of "the law" is final. The ease,
almost instinctive, with which one follows precedent makes it especially
important that the law-trained man be educated to be eternally vigilant
against blind acceptance. That caution is his skill.
iThe most renowned law schools, however, are frequently indicted
as training appellate judges when they should be trade schools teaching
"black-letter" law and training counselors; complaint is made that law
schools place too great emphasis on change in law, or what the law
"should be," and that this emphasis is out of proportion to the sort
of activity which will occupy the graduate in practice as a lawyer. The
uncertainty as to the content of "the law" is not attributable to a failure
in educational technique. It should be clear that education which does
not prepare one to anticipate both the possibility and the degree of like-
lihood of change in "law" will make one deficient as a counselor. Social
36 John N. Pomeroy in T[EODOnE SEDGWIOK, A TREATISE ON TE RULES W1iOI1
GOVERN THE INTERPRWEATIO " AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTOIRY AND CONSTITU-
TIoNAL LAW 270 n. (Pomeroy ed. 1874).
3s The New York Law Revision Commission is charged with the duty "of dis-
covering defects and anachronisms in the law" and recommending changes "to,
modify or eliminate antiquated and inequitable rules of law, and to bring the law
of this state, civil and criminal, into harmony with modern conditions." N.Y.LEa.
LAw § 72. See also N. Y. JumiciaY LAw § 45 for like authorization of the Judicial
Council.
38 George Washington, letter to [Mr. Justice] Bushrod Washington, November 10,
1787, 9 Tan WRITINGs OF GEORGE WASHINGTO 277, 279 (1835).
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.and economic conditions and other factors change; within recent genera-
tions, they have changed faster than ever before. The "law" appropriate
to these conditions has similarly changed or developed,39 and at about
the same pace, but with a time lag. The training of law s.tudents con-
.sequently must prepare them not only to handle routine matters, but also
to anticipate changes which will adapt the law to the altering conditions
,of contemporary life. Also, although routine situations may constitute
the bulk of one's activity in ordinary practice, some more complex prob-
lems are bound to arise. Any layman can, for a dollar or less, buy a
,compact "Compendium of Business Law," but what the layman wants is
not elegant i juris, but counsel.
The counselor (who is an officer of the court) owes a primary duty
to the community not to advise action, albeit within the four corners
of earlier precedents, if it runs counter to the morality and interests of
the community collectively. At the same time, such enlightened counsel
will be of service to a client who might otherwise be the first to be con-
victed by the heightened sentiment of the community. The plaint of the
high financiers of the Twenties that they were simply doing what others
had been "getting away with" was not entirely baseless; their error (or
that of their counsel) was in not correctly gauging a shortening time lag
between "stability" in law and the ability of the community and the courts
to catch up with novel predatory practices."0
iThe lawyer's prophecy of what the courts will do has two aspects:
(1) He cad determine with a reasonable degree of accuracy the back-
ground-whether there is an applicable statute, and, statute or not, what
the courts have done previously in the same or almost similar situations.
Cardozo estimated that nine-tenths of all cases coming before the ap-
pellate courts are predetermined by precedent.' (2) The guesswork
comes in predicting whether the specific case is one of the uncertain one-
tenth. The prediction depends on an intervening future human act-
whether the judge will be convinced, if the matter comes to litigation:
that the precedents are in point, and sustain the principle urged; that
39An examination of the last bound volume of Reports of the United States
Supreme Court (Vol. 331) discloses that, of the cases in which opinions were writ-
ten, only a half-dozen brougtit before the Court subjects which by any stretch of
the imagination had been before the couarts by 1776: one on freedom of the press,
one on freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, one on rules of evidence, and
three on property rights with international or nation-wide ramifications. The other
opinions were concerned with questions of constitutional law and the application
of statutes, especially those creating administrative agencies and those dealing with
bankruptcy, income taxation, trade-marks, and the statute of limitations.
40 "Imagine a state of society in which it is possible to travel through life with
a criminal purpose and yet never, because of this legal time-lag, leave the white
squares of legal innocence." REBECCA WEST, E WI.EA.IIG OF TBEAsoN 64 (1947).
41 CAuDnozo, Tnx GzowTn oF Tfl LAw 60 (1924).
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there are no conflicting precedents; that the precedents are reasonable;
and that no additional factors (including economic or social changes)
now require a different ruling.' Whether a lawyer is "good" then
turns on his having been trained to find prior decisions which bear on
the principles involved in the problem; his ability to reason (which in-
cludes the skill to anticipate which of conflicting precedents or principJes
will prevail); and his general knowledge of the community interest
which will bear upon the decision. Even so, his prediction may prove
erroneous if these various elements are not adequately presented by the
advocates before the court when the matter reaches litigation. Inade-
quate presentation may result in the court's following "black-letter" law
-right or wrong. But a lawyer cannot base his advice on anticipation
of inadequate presentation in the event that a problem reaches the courts.
More important than the student's absorption of "black-letter" law
is his training in analysis and the formulation of law, a subiject which
will be discussed in some detail hereafter. When the student becomes a
lawyer, he is expected to apply to the problems of his clients the power
of analysis in which he has been trained at law school. If he has not
acquired this skill, he cannot be considered a lawyer regardless of how
much "black-letter" law he has memorized.
D
In the early days of law studies, the stark "precedent" days when
choice of the correct writ was vital and the merits unimportant, students
concentrated on what we today would consider adjective law. Now that
aspect of law administration is the most neglected in the law school.
Law school courses do make it possible for the student to learn the
rules of adjective law-the basic materials essential to the drafting of a
pleading-but they cannot be expected to and they do not develop skill
in draftsmanship, which is a facility in composition which comes only
after years of application. Law schools also give instruction in the
rules applicable to the operation of the law machinery made available
by the community, but they cannot be expected to and they do not de-
velop skill in the conduct of trials-a talent also requiring long practice.
That the law schools do not attempt to develop these skills requiring
practice rather than precept is understandable.
Less excusable, however, is the failure of the law school to develop in
the student an attitude toward the adjective law comparable to the "ap-
proach" to substantive law. I refer here not to skill in the use of law
42Words change in meaning. A "manufactured" article no longer connotes some-
thing made by hand. The term "commerce" today bears no relation to Its connota-
tion in 1789.
[VOL. 'I
A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE LAW SCHOOLS
machinery, but to an ethic-a realization of the vital role of the lawyer
in the administration of justice and an appreciation of his responsibility.
As important as knowledge of the rules is avoidance of their misuse.
Almost at the very inception of legal education in England, a writer
,envisaging the possibility of abuse of legal practice warned:
That every pleader is bound by oath that he will not knowingly maintain or
defend wrong or falsehood, but will abandon his client immediately that he
perceives his wrongdoing. Thirdly, that he will never have recourse to false
-delays or false witnesses, and never allege, proffer, or consent to any cor-
ruption, lie, or falsified law, but loyally will maintain the right of his client,
so that he may not fail through his folly, or negligence, nor by default of
him, nor by default of any argument that he could urge.43
This ancient exhortation unfortunately continues to be a needed warning
to this day.
The law schools bear a heavy responsibility both for what is included
in and what is omitted from the curriculum. The lacunae noted are
doubly serious: first, because law is inanimate except as administered,
.and second because the lawyer's participation in the administration or
-maladministration of law is more patent than his part in the making of
law. The law schools could by affirmative action in the training of law
students take a constructive part in liw administration and help consider-
.ably in reducing the disrepute in which law is held.
Bearing in mind that the administration of justice is the process where-
'by the conformity of law to justice is induced, we must note that lawyers'
:advice (whether based upon statute or case law) is itself law to the client
-law, perhaps, which conflicts with law which may be pronounced by
:another lawyer, but nevertheless a factor which will to some extent deter-
mine the conduct of the client. Were lawyers to give their clients the
unbiased, considered judgment expected of judges in an ideal state, dis-
putes and litigation would be cut down considerably.
III
THE METHoD oF STUDY
The methods of legal education in vogue over the last three hundred
-years may be traced through three major stages: (1) the apprentice
method, (2) the lecture method, and (3) the case method." More than
4 3 AEiDREW HORN, TnE MixuRon. OF JUSTicES, Bk. 2, § 5 (Selden Society Publication
for 1895). (This treatise is believed to have been written in 1307; its author died
in 1328).
44 Only Anglo-American legal education is being discussed in the text. It may
be noted that law schools existed under Justinian, and attendance at such schools
was compulgory for those who expected to be judges or practitioners. SAviGo-,
•HIsToRY 435, 440 (Cathcart trans. 1829).
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pedagogical interest is aroused by the changes since the old-time practice
of learning immutable law was superseded by a form of study calculated
to develop skills in analysis and in the formulation of law based upon a
consideration of broad social policy. Although the different major
stages were never clean-cut, and overlap to this day, can we draw any
conclusions as to whether the method of study was or is in any way re-
sponsible for the concurrently prevailing attitude toward law and justice?
Discussion in the classroom among a heterogeneous body of students
has changed the approach from "How did a court decide a given prob-
lem?" to "How and why?" Discussion is not confined to what the law
"is," but extended to what the law "should be." Where there is a vari-
ance between what the law "is" and what it "should be," it is a safe
prediction that within a generation these or similarly trained students
will-as judges-rule that what the law "should be" "is" the law. The
students, meanwhile, have been put on their guard against thinking that
what the law "is" when they are at law school will be the law when they
are in practice. The law schools here are clearly leading the way for the
courts, and one must be indeed short-sighted who does not realize the
powerful social force-the significant effect upon future decisions--of
this type of indoctrination in the law school. It is helpful to bear in
mind Holmes's frank summary: "The prophecies of what the courts will
do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law." 4"
Implicit in classroom discussion is another major aspect of law-the
true function of the courts. Despite the implications of its name, the
case method tends to weaken the effect of mere cases as authority. It
has thus been salutary in counteracting a very unhealthful consequence of
the multiplicity of decisions which flooded the country. As decisions
became more numerous, the average practitioner and the lower court
judge tended to rely upon a precedent "on all fours" rather than to search
out and test the applicable principles-a difficult task for one who has
been taught under the lecture system and who has simply memorized a
number of general principles not differing much from the maxims (hasty
generalizations) which served our forefathers.
Certainty in the law meanwhile has not been materially weakened.
The case method coupled with the sociological approach at times leads
not only to departures from prior decisions, but also to the predictability
of such changes; 46 the latter result refutes the criticism that the case
45 OIV'Ep WENDELL HOLlES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPEits 173 (1920). "For legal
purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy." Holmes, Natitral Law, 32
HAnv.TIEv. 40, 42 (1918).
46 "In recent years, however, seven of the nine justices have been replaced and
an examination of the changes effected by the decisions of the reconstituted Court Is
necessary to map out the present boundaries of the commerce clause." Note, 42
[VOL. I
A LAWYER LooKs AT THE LAW SCHOOLS
method with its "what-the-law-should-be" approach does not properly
prepare practitioners. Departure from precedent does not deny stability
in the law. If there were no stability, the change would be meaningless
because the law could be changed again tomorrow and the whipsawing
back and forth would result in chaos. There is a fixed element in our
law, that prior decisions are followed unless a change is called for by
logic or experience or a factor not previously evaluated. Once a change
is effected, the new law becomes just as certain as was that before. The
resulting elasticity leaves the "law" no more uncertain than when equity
began to supplement the common law, which had proved unable to cope
with certain situations. Yet how harsh and intolerable would our law be
to-day had various equitable rights been denied because they introduced
some element of uncertainty into the common law!
A weakness in the case method as it was used until the late Twenties
was that the use of cases developed into an obsession. Even relevant
statutes frequently went unmentioned. The result was that students,
who thought that their classroom discussions culminated in current legal
doctrine or in conclusions as to what the law "ought to be," never learned,
for example, of statutes expressly to the contrary. Another limitation
was that the student's knowledge of the social factors which were bring-
ing about changes in law (even common business activities and normal
legal documents) was confined to such information as appeared haphaz-
ardly in opinions dealing with pathological cases.
Although all law schools now direct attention both to statutes and to
the new sociological jurisprudence, not all give training in their use and
application. Most schools have been slow to incorporate non-case ma-
terial into a curriculum which is already overwhelming; moreover, ma-
terial giving information is a departure from the technique of the case
method, which endeavors rather to give training in analysis. On the
other hand, it may be urged, the information to be supplied is little dif-
ferent from that which, in earlier periods, it was assumed the student
had previously learned and brought to the study of law: to understand
medieval rules, the student must have a knowledge of the feudal system.
Institution of the case method, it cannot be doubted, caused the law to
be considerably influenced by the views of teachers who were never to be
on the"bench-but whose pupils would be. Wigmore and Williston are
far more persuasive authorities for legal principles in the subjects with
which their names are respectively associated than many a judge.4 7 Some
writer-teachers are frank to admit that their views of the law are formu-
CoL.L.lrEv. 1333 (1942). cf. Palmer, Dissents and Overrulings: A StuZy 6f Devel.
Dpments in the Supreme Court, 34 A.B.A.J. 554 (1948).
47 Cf. Oliphant, A Returnb to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A.J. 71, 159 (1928).
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lated as a result of the unrestrained classroom discussion. Such discus-
sion among students of differing views developed into the sociological
approach; and the elevation to appellate courts during the last twenty
years of so many law school deans and teachers who have led and been
exposed to discussions in the law school class leaves little doubt that the
law of the near future will continue to evidence a consideration of its
social functions.4
In the eighteenth century, during the early "pupilage" era at the Inns,
the mode of education seems to have been unimportant, for British prac-
titioners and judges continued extremely conservative while Americans
similarly trained at the Inns displayed greater responsiveness to popular
ideas. The explanation may be that in America it was the people who
elected the judges. The effect of education on the law became more ob-
servable after Blackstone's lectures, published as his Commwntaries, built
up a systematic conception of law and made the English legal pattern
coherent and intelligent. He was speedily followed by a century of
treatises by American teachers of law. In England treatises could not
be cited as authority unless the writer was or subsequently became a
judge (and the authority then was judicial rather than professional).4D
In this country a distinguished line of nationally known teacher-writers
has left an inescapable impress upon the law.
Although in the early days changes in legal attitude appear to have
preceded changes in legal study, the order was completely reversed with
the inauguration of the case method.and the broadening of the class of
law students. The possibility that this recent sequence may continue puts
even greater responsibility on those who select not only the law school
curriculum but also the pedagogical devices employed.
Interestingly enough, the substantial changes in legal education have
followed important wars. After the Civil War of 1642, the Inns aban-
doned their traditional practices, which were superseded by the "pupil-
age" system or apprentice stage. After the American Revolution, the
Litchfield School in Connecticut developed the lecture method (organ-
ized law study, conducted by professional teachers). After the American
Civil War, Langdell initiated his famous case method with its emphasis
48 The trend toward identifying social justice with "the law" has been charted
by Dean Roscoe Pound, A Generation of Improvement of the Administration of
Justice, 22 N.Y.U.L.Q.REv. 369 (1947). The trend has also been confirmed by a
distinguished historian's conclusions as to the changing functions of the state.
Toynbee, Bampton Lectures in America (delivered at Columbia University In the
City of New York, April 14, 1948, not yet published).
49,johnes v. Johnes, 3 Dow 1, 15, 3 Eng.Rep. 969, 974 (H.L. 1814). For ad-ltlonal
authorities applying the English rule that a writer to be cited must have been or
must have become a judge and that the living could not be cited, see Roscon
PouiD, Tnm Fo TrVA Evs A OF A.nm oAN- LAw 139, 167 (1938).
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upon self-education (student formulation of law inductively from the
cases themselves). And World War I was followed by sociological
jurisprudence with its frank consideration of social and economic factors
-arithmetic rather than rhetoric. Our present view is that all but the




Before the next chapter in legal education is written, a decision must
be reached whether the practice of law is a "public" or a "private" call-
ing. Once this issue is determined, the law school may have a clearly
stated goal and may vigorously undertake to implement its objectives.
The individual lawyer occupies an anomalous position in the adminis-
tration of justice. It is said to be his duty to advance the claims and in-
terests of his client, and at the same time he is told that he is a member
of a profession which collectively has the responsibility of administering
and promoting justice. Regardless of the canon of "ethics" upon which
he may rely, the lawyer who will sacrifice the welfare of the community
to benefit an individual client ultimately arouses the community's hatred,
contempt, and ridicule. Admittedly, the law schools must train the stu-
dent to give competent service to his client; but more important than the
development of trade skill, the community says, is the development of a
wholesome professional attitude-that the skill be used to further, not
thwart, the welfare of the community. Without such an attitude the
skill is not merely undesirable; it is a menace.
Unless the student while at law school is thoroughly indoctrinated with
this viewpoint of the welfare of the community, his ultimate objectives
may be dangerously at variance. Once the novitiate begins to practice,
he will be confronted by tremendous private pressures, equally powerful
whether he is wealthy or not. He may be more successful as a lawyer
if he is not hampered by a social conscience (a knowledge of the social
interest may prove of Machiavellian value to him). If only his personal
success is the criterion, more valuable than policy-training or, in fact,
any knowledge of substantive law would be courses on how to find clients
("get business"), how to win the friendship of political leaders, and so
forth.
The law school, on the other hand, is the representative of the com-
munity and consequently should be motivated solely by the desire to sup-
ply competently trained individuals who will further the administration
of justice, whether as lawyers, judges, legislators, or public officials.
Ironically, the viewpoint just stated is negatived by "conservative"
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groups which deprecate "policy training" and take the attitude that the
law school should concentrate on professional competence.
It must be admitted that the shift in emphasis to policy-learning as the
vital aspect of law study has caused less attention to be paid to positive
substantive law and still less to adjective law. Some efforts may be
expected and approved to give students "experience" in the use of the
legal machinery. Caution must be exercised, however, to make sure that
new or different techniques involve only techniques and do not cloak a
difference in views as.to the scope of the law as a social science. No one
can deny that it would be desirable if the prospective lawyer acquired not
only a philosophy of.law and analytical technique, but also practical ex-
perience in consultation with clients, in drafting pleadings and legal in-
struments, in the actual trial of cases and argument of appeals, and in
dealing with life-and-blood clients, witnesses, adversaries, and judges.
But human lifetime is limited, and that portion of it devoted to vocational
preparation. is still more limited. Within the training period what is
it most important to do? My opinion is that in the limited law school
years there should be emphasized the ultimate purpose of law and a tech-
nique of analysis which the future lawyer cannot acquire on his own or
in a law office.
A number of law schools (including Harvard and Yale) have at-
tempted to give their students "clinical" experience (somewhat analogous
to that given medical and dental students) by requiring or giving credit
for student work in a legal aid bureau. There was recently published a
graphic description of this type of training as developed in one of the
progressive schools."0 It invites similar experimentation by other law
schools. Its usefulness as a public service to residents of the community
is unquestioned, and the experience will make law study more interesting
to the students and may possibly have some permanent value for them;
but quaere whether it is of such relative value as to justify* any appre-
ciable portion of the three-year period usually allocated to law school
study.
More useful appears a new course in "Case Studies," recently initiated
at Yale, wherein the complete record and proceedings of an actual litiga-
tion finally determined by the higfiest court of a state or the Supreme
Court of the United States are the subject of study. The course pro-
poses to analyze the legal problems as they appear to counsel when the
case first comes to him; determine the modus operandi for h.ndling the
case, and the reasons for the choice; consider business problems involved
50 Bradway, Education for Law Practice: Lawz Students Can Be Given Clinical
Experience, 34 A.B.A.J. 103 (1948).
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which affect the handling of the case; and trace the action as prepared
for trial, and through trial and appeal."' This course could be still more
useful and realistic if the illustrative problems involved were less crucial
and did not go to a court of last resort. Of 800 litigable matters which
reach the lawyer's office, only one, on the average, reaches the court of
last resort;" and decisions must be madle by the attorney who cannot
rely on ultimate correction by a higher court-even if the client can af-
ford and is willing to pay for that luxury.
This type of supplement to the generally accepted law school curricu-
lum, however, justifies experiment. Intermediate appeal "Cases and
Points" which contain all the necessary source material are readily avail-
able and will prove of unusual interest and enlightenment. The practical
operations in a court may be studied-albeit from a printed page-with
greater efficiency than the cases which come to a legal aid clinic. Actual
facts may be contrasted with those which the judge (trial or appellate)
saw fit to use in his opinion to make it seem more persuasive. The pos-
sibility that the judicial opinion will some day in a law school class be
matched up against the record may have a salutary effect upon judges.
On the substantive-law front, any increase in the proportion of "black-
letter" law taught in the law schools is unlikely. It is extremely signifi-
cant that when the Civil Service Commission's Board of Legal Examin-
ers had occasion during World War II to test some 13,000 candidates for
legal- positions in the Federal Government service,5 the written tests
required no legal information (other than that supplied iri the question).
The tests were constructed to measure professional competence-ability
to perform the analytical, deductive, and interpretative functions in-
volved in legal work-and to ascertain the candidate's knowledge of
current events and general knowledge of economics, history, and gov-
ernment. A conventional intelligence test (vocabulary and comprehen-'
sion) completed the written examination.54 This screening was fol-
51 BULLETII or YALE Ui=q-ERsiTy: REPnTs OF TnE DEAvs AD OF TiE IrBRAR-
ANs OF T=E LAw ScHooL FOR Tim AcAnmac YEARS 1944-1946 28 (1946); LAw ScHooL
Ax oUNCEMENT FOr THE ACAaEMIC YEAR, 1947-1948 29 (1947).
52 "Statistics based upon a study of litigation in New York County show that
(roughly) compared to one case disposed of by the Court of Appeals, four are dis-
posed of by the Appellate Division, 33 by the trial tribunal, 66 by the calendar
judge, and 180 by the judge presiding at motions; while in 492 disposition should
be credited to the lawyer, through preliminary investigation or settlement." Philip
T. McCook, address delivered January 27, 1933, reprinted in OURTEExN YEARS OF
Ju iciAL SERVICE (1933).
53 Salary $3,200 a year, or less.
54 Weihofen, The 17ritten Federal Attorney Tarmination, 11 U. OF OHI.L.REV. 154
(1944); Weihofen, Investigational Possibilities in the Area of Boamination Tech,
niques, 9 A.L.SCHoo. REV. 1329 (1942).
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lowed by an oral examination to determine the candidate's experience,
personality, and proficiency.ss
The great value of such training was confirmed by the experience of
Chief Justice Stone, who declared towards the close of the 1941 term of
the Supreme Court that since October he had examined 1,200 cases,
none having anything to do with what he had studied in law school.
Yet he was completely prepared. "I am of the opinion," he said, "that
it does not matter so very much what subject is studied, if it has good
legal material of current importance." '
Very desirable would be classes small enough to permit personal atten-
tion by the instructor so that every student might experience the equiva-
lent of law review training. Each student could be assigned a case or
problem. Then, after the assignment had been worked out and Written
up by the student, the instructor in class could review the procedure and
criticize the product in detail. Student work sufficiently worthy might
be published either in the school's recognized law review or in a special
publication.
Inevitably, the law school of the near future will spend much more
time than its predecessor on the theory and processes of administrative
agencies.,.7 Administrative law, it may be predicted, will match the im-
portance of equity in our legal system. Opposition to administrative
agencies, while sometimes sincere, is reminiscent of similar, equally sin-
cere opposition in the days of Coke to the encroachment of equity upon
the common law.s But the administrative agencies are here to stay.
Many social and economic problems are too complex to be handled by
pre-existing legal machinery, and the growth of these agencies makes
necessary schooling in their theory and operation.
In considering future legal education, we should bear in mind a politi-
cal condition-the "global" attitude of our statesmen. I anticipate that
just as the financial center of the world moved from Lombard Street
55 Wechsler, Cannon, and Hurst, Lawyers Under the United States uivll Service,
9 Am. L. SCHooL REV. 1307 (1942).
56 N.Y.Times, May 27, 1942, p. 13, col. 4.
57 Professor Gellhorn has recently urged that the Columbia Law School (which
initiated the Legislative Drafting O!ice subsequently adopted by Congress) should
now make available for the benefit of the Federal and state governments an "Office
of Administrative Procedure" to concern itself with control, procedures, and prac-
tices in administrative agencies, to maintain a staff continually examining them
objectively and critically, to act as a clearing-house receiving complaints or sug-
gestions, and to give expert assistance to any national or state officials seeking tech-
nical assistance. Gellhorn, Administrative Procedure Office-At (7olum.bia, Colum-
bia Law School News, April 2, 1948, p. 3.
58 Now, so respected a historian as Maitland says that "equity saved the common
law." H. A. L. F snn (ED.), Tan CoLLECTED PAPF.'s OF FREDERIC W. MAITLAND
496 (1911).
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to Wall Street, the law center of the world will also find itself in New
York City. The United Nations Library must be in this city as part of
the regular U. N. organization. Columbia University is building up an
extensive library of foreign law, and New York University has an-
nounced establishment of an Inter-American Law Institute to study the
common law and the civil law on a comparative basis at the graduate
level and thereby promote mutual understanding between the two Ameri-
can civilizations.' When these foreign materials are thus made more
readily available, and more students from other countries intermingle
with our own, we may expect comparisons and contrasts and a "give and
take" which is bound to be reflected not only in the body of law but also
in the manner of teaching it. At the same time we must be doubly alert,
because the views of other countries as to the desirability of our way of
life will be largely determined by the "justice" accomplished by our legal
system.
59 REPORT OF THE DEAI OF TiE SCHOOL OF LAW, NEW YORK UI -vEitsTy 1945-
1946 13-14 (1946). The degree of Master of Comparative Jurisprudence will be
awarded.
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